We develop a spatial model of oligopolistic competition in which firms simultaneously choose franchise locations and prices, and consumers receive uncorrelated firmspecific location shocks. Remarkably, when firms only differ along the endogenous contestable spatial dimension, they earn zero profits: while ex-post consumer heterogeneity ensures positive gross profits, competition for market share via franchise/product location results in over-provision of franchises and zero net profits. More generally, if firms face different franchise costs, the disadvantaged firm breaks even. Only when we introduce exogenous non-contestable taste heterogeneity across consumers, do both firms extract positive profits. But even here, franchise competition reduces firm profits.
Introduction
What happens when firms compete using both product locations and prices? More concretely, how does Wendy's compete against Burger King, or Coca-Cola compete against PepsiCo, and how successful will they be at exploiting endogenous product-specific heterogeneity to extract profits?
These questions get at the heart of competition between firms. However, these fundamental questions have been left unanswered by the profession due to the intractability of endogenizing product location and pricing in standard spatial models, where optimal pricing hinges sensitively on the specific details of the location of each and every product variety or franchise.
We develop a novel spatial structure to get at these questions. The key feature is that consumers receive firm-specific location shocks. Hence, a consumer's location relative to one firm's franchise network is unrelated to his location relative to another firm's franchise network. The other features of our economy are standard. First, firms choose product locations and their prices. Then, consumers receive spatial shocks and choose where to shop given the prices and distances from product locations.
We first consider an environment where consumer heterogeneity is purely contestable, where the only source of heterogeneity is the spatial heterogeneity that firms endogenously introduce via their franchise locations. We prove that when consumers are distributed uniformly across spatial locations, firms optimally spread their franchises evenly and set the same price at each franchise location. Hence, prices reflect only the average properties of the two networks-summarized by each firm's concentration of franchise locations.
With these basic results in hand, we then prove that competition in both prices and franchise locations leads to a stark result. Due to the ex-post heterogeneity in the distances consumers must travel to each firm's franchise location, it is immediate that firms can generate positive gross profits, i.e., profits before consideration of franchise location costs. What is remarkable is that competition for market share via franchise concentration exhausts those profits-the gross profits from product sales just cover the costs of establishing the franchises.
This qualitative finding extends when there is additional heterogeneity between firms.
Specifically, when one firm has a "better product", one that, ceteris paribus, all consumers prefer, and/or lower costs of franchise development, the "disadvantaged" firm earns zero net profits. Only when there is heterogeneity along a non-contestable dimension-so that, ex-ante, some consumers prefer Wendy's hamburgers, while others prefer Burger King's-do both firms extract positive net profits. What is surprising is that the magnitude of franchise over-provision is increased: the spatial contestable dimension actually reduces firm profits below their levels when consumers are distinguished solely by their non-contestable tastes for one firm's product. Fixing spatial heterogeneity, the price elasticity of demand for each firm is highest when taste heterogeneity is small. As a result, the effect of the contestable dimension on marginal profit is greatest when non-contestable heterogeneity is small. As taste heterogeneity increases, the price elasticity of demand for each firm falls, so that the firms compete away a smaller fraction of profits. Still, the marginal profit loss remains positive, and for large enough taste heterogeneity, the total accumulated profit loss equals the total franchise establishment cost.
Finally, we prove that competition for market share results in over-provision of franchises from a social perspective-the competitive equilibrium features more franchises than a social planner would choose. Because higher franchise concentrations imply lower prices, an immediate implication is that firm profits are lower and consumer surplus is higher in the competitive equilibrium, than they would be were franchise locations chosen by a social planner.
Our spatial model delivers the key empirical regularities of franchising. Our model predicts that franchise prices do not vary with location, as is common practice. For example, the prices of Wendy's hamburgers in Champaign-Urbana do not vary across franchise locations, and, in particular, they do not vary with the distance between a Wendy's franchise and other fast food franchises.
1 In sharp contrast, in standard spatial models, even taking franchise locations as exogenous, equilibrium pricing varies across location, and is sensitive to the exact spatial location of every franchise. Our model also predicts that what is relevant for the placement of Wendy's franchises, is the location of other Wendy's franchises.
In practice, while one may or may not see a Burger King next to a Wendy's, one Wendy's franchise is never located close to another.
It may be that other considerations enter franchise locations and the uniformity of pricing across one firm's franchises. Our model provides a way to integrate these aspects in a tractable way. Our model also has the virtue of being amenable to analysis even in asymmetric settings in which firms are heterogeneous along multiple dimensions.
The outline of the paper is as follows. In section 2 we show that an optimal response to 1 Similarly, Coca-Cola charges the same price for each of its flavors of carbonated soft drink. Yet, some Coca Cola flavours have an almost equivalent competing firm product (Coke vs Pepsi) while other flavors do not (Fanta or Barq's) . ?] supports this empirical regularity. In a study of the carbonated soft drink market in urban Chicago he finds substantial evidence of uniform pricing at the manufacturer-brand-size level.
any franchise network structure of the other firm features identical pricing at each franchise and franchise locations that equate market shares of each franchise. We then assume these features and treat the number of franchises of a firm as a continuous variable, focusing on the concentration of franchises. Section 3 develops our core continuous model with two symmetric firms. Section 4 extends the analysis first to an asymmetric two firm setting and then to a symmetric N -firm setting. Section 5 contrasts the competitive equilibrium with the solution that a social planner would choose. Section 6 explores how heterogeneous consumer tastes affects outcomes. Section 7 concludes. All proofs are in the Appendix.
Methodology and Related Research
Using spatial concepts to model economic phenomena, and market structure in particular, dates back to Hotelling [1929] . Subsequent notable contributions include Lancaster [1971] , d 'Aspremont et al. [1979] and Salop [1979] . Most closely to our research, researchers have analyzed the simpler problem of endogenizing the range of appeal for a single product, supposing that firms provide a product characterized by an interval [a, b] (see Dewan et al. [2000 Dewan et al. [ , 2003 or Alexandrov [2008] ). Other related research includes Bernhardt et al. [2007] , which models product customization, where firms invest in technologies that consumers can use to imperfectly tailor the product to their preferences; and Bernhardt and Massoud [2005] , which models the design of ATM networks.
However, the issue of franchise location and pricing has remained open. The central reason is that solving for equilibrium outcomes when location and pricing is endogenous is infeasible in standard models. To ensure that a posited set of (price, location) strategies is an equilibrium, one must verify that no deviation in location or prices can raise profits. In standard spatial models where duopolists choose both product ranges and prices, this is a heroic task. For example, in a circular spatial setting, if firm A believes that firm B will locate only at opposite sides of the circle, firm A must still calculate its possible profits not just from two locations, but from three (and four, and five...) locations. But three locations necessarily introduces asymmetries across local markets, and hence pricing at each franchise location that depends on the precise details of all franchise locations, rendering a solution infeasible.
Indeed, in standard spatial settings, payoffs are not generally quasiconcave or continuous, so that pure strategy equilibria often do not exist. de Palma et al. [1985] obtain existence by adding heterogeneous consumer tastes that are orthogonal to the spatial dimension, using a multinomial logit specification: They find that with sufficient consumer heterogeneity, equi-libria in pure strategies exist when firms compete simultaneously over both price and location.
Discrete Model
Our core model develops a spatial oligopoly game between two firms, A and B. The firms compete to provide a product to a measure 1 of consumers. Each firm is associated with its own spatial circle with circumference of length L along which consumers are distributed.
Consumers must travel to a franchise location to purchase a product, incurring a linear travel cost of T d from traveling distance d, where T > 0. The cost to a firm of establishing a franchise at any point on its spatial circle is F > 0. Hence, the total cost to firm j ∈ {A, B} of establishing n j franchises is n j F . The marginal cost of providing the good is constant and normalized to 0. Firms seek to maximize profit.
We index firm j's franchises by 1, 2, . . . n j , and let N j = {1, . . . , n j }. We define l j i to be the location of the i th franchise of firm j. Without loss of generality we normalize the location of franchise j 1 to l j 1 = 0 and order franchises so that l j i < l j i+1 . One can interpret franchise locations as the store locations (e.g., of Wendy's franchises) in a franchise network or as the characteristics locations (e.g., of Coca-Cola soft drink flavors) of a firm's product line. Franchise i of firm j charges price p j i for its product. A strategy for firm j is a franchise
] that specifies the number of franchises, each franchise location, and the price set by each franchise. The set of possible franchise profiles for firm j is Σ j . Firm B's spatial circle Figure 1 : Consumer c receives a location shock, d c j , for each firm, A and B. Shocks are independent so points on one circle are independent of points on the other circle. l j i is the location of firm j's ith franchise.
A consumer receives utility V from the homogeneous good that the two firms sell. We assume that V is large enough that, in equilibrium, all consumers purchase the good. After firms choose franchise profiles, consumers receive firm-specific location shocks, d A and d B .
For firm j, a given consumer c is equally likely to be located at any point on firm j's circle, and c's location on firm A's spatial circle is uncorrelated with his location on firm B's spatial circle. Figure 1 shows a potential location realization for consumer c. These location shocks could reflect geographical differentiation with associated transportation costs, or product characteristic differentiation with associated dis-utility from not consuming at one's most preferred point in the characteristic space. The location shocks are easiest to interpret in characteristic space: for example, a consumer may prefer Diet Coke to Coke, i.e. be closer to Diet Coke than to Coke in characteristic space, but be equally likely to prefer Pepsi or Diet Pepsi.
We define δ c j (S j , S −j ) to be an indicator function that takes on the value 1 if consumer c purchases from a firm j franchise and is 0 otherwise. Consumer c maximizes utility when Given franchise profiles (S A , S B ), let y j i (d j , S A , S B ) be the conditional probability that a consumer with location shock d j purchases from franchise j i and let Y j i (S A , S B ) be the expected measure of consumers who purchase from franchise j i . Explicit solutions for
Equilibrium. An equilibrium is a collection of (i) franchise profiles,
], j ∈ {A, B}, and (ii) a set of demand functions for each consumer c, δ c * j (S A , S B ), such that
• Franchise profiles maximize profit
given subsequent optimization by almost all consumers, and
• Almost every consumer maximizes utility.
We first characterize how a firm's own franchises compete with each other for consumers.
To do this, we develop the notion of franchise j i 's service area -the set of optimizing consumers who, if they purchase from firm j, will do so at franchise j i . In any equilibrium, each of firm j's franchises must be patronized by some customers (else the costly franchise ought not be built); however, among consumers who purchase from firm j, only those who are sufficiently nearby franchise j i will patronize it. Accordingly, we let a j i,i+1 (S j ) be the identity of the consumer who is indifferent between purchasing from firm j at franchises j i and j i+1 :
where l j 1 = 0 and l j n j +1 = 1 (the position of the first franchise from the viewpoint of the last franchise). Any optimizing consumer located outside of [a j i−1,i (S j ), a j i,i+1 (S j )] who purchases from firm j can derive a higher payoff by patronizing a firm j franchise other than j i (in particular, patronizing franchise j i+1 or j i−1 ).
Franchise j i is isolated if j i does not compete against other firm j franchises for market share. In particular, if franchise j i is isolated, then an individual located at a j i−1,i (S j ), who is indifferent between purchasing from j i and j i−1 , prefers with probability one to purchase from the other firm. If a firm's franchises are isolated, then they only compete for customers against the other firm. In contrast, franchise j i is connected if j i competes for customers with both adjacent franchises, j i−1 and j i+1 , in addition to competing against the other firm.
If a franchise is neither isolated nor connected we refer to it as semi-connected. We first establish an important result for how a firm's franchises compete against each other.
Lemma 1. In firm j's best response, either all franchises are isolated or all franchises are connected.
A firm with a mix of isolated, semi-connected and connected franchises can increase the market share for its product at fixed prices by bringing its isolated franchises marginally closer together and spreading its other franchises marginally further apart. The market share of its isolated franchises remains unchanged because these franchises do not compete against each other for customers; while the market shares of the remaining franchises grow because their service areas increase. We now characterize the implications of Lemma 1 for pricing and location.
Lemma 2. Suppose firm j's best response to S −j has only isolated franchises. Then firm j's best response features identical pricing at each franchise and equal market shares.
Because each firm j franchise is isolated, each firm j franchise faces the same demand curve. It follows that charging the same price at each franchise, and hence capturing the same market share is a best response.
We now consider a firm with connected franchises. The analogous result to Lemma 2 is that this firm does best to space its franchises equally, and set the same price at each franchise. To prove this result we first show that equal spacing and identical pricing solves the firm's first-order conditions for profit maximization; an exhaustive numerical analysis then indicates that the first-order conditions characterize the optimal response.
Lemma 3. Suppose firm j's best response to S −j has connected franchises. Then firm j's best response spaces franchises at equal distances and sets identical prices.
These lemmas show that our model delivers key empirical features of the franchise industry. In particular, an optimizing firm sets the same price for its product at each of its franchises, regardless of the structure of the competing firm's franchise network. Of course, the optimal level of this price choice will depend on the structure of the competing network.
The important corollary of these lemmas is that without loss of generality, we can restrict attention to strategies that feature franchise profiles with uniform pricing and equidistant franchise spacing, and consider demand for a representative firm j franchise. We now do this, treating the number of franchises as a continuous variable and focusing on a firm's choice of franchise concentration. As L gets large, this approximation approaches the outcome for an integer number of franchises. Because we now focus on a representative firm j franchise, we use d c j to measure the distance of consumer c from a firm j franchise.
Symmetric Firm Continuous Model
For the remaining analysis, without loss of generality, we assume that p A ≥ p B . We will show that if p A ≥ p B , then, in equilibrium, firm B's franchises will be isolated, competing only for the market share from firm A franchises, and not cannibalizing market share from its own franchise family. In turn, this will imply that firm B cannot earn positive profits.
2.1: Market shares when firm
B franchises are isolated.
2.2: Market shares when firm
A franchises are isolated. 
Then this marginal consumer prefers to purchase from firm A, implying that firm B franchises are isolated. Figure 2 .2 illustrates the other possibility, i.e., where instead,
Then the marginal consumer prefers to purchase from firm B, implying that the firm A fran-chises are isolated. Hence, if firm B franchises are isolated, i.e., if equation (1) holds, then
If, instead, firm A franchises are isolated, i.e., if equation (2) holds, then
Firm profits are Because the marginal change in a firm's market share due to an increase in its price is the same for both firms, in equilibrium, firm A has a higher market share than firm B. Lemma 4 reveals that a necessary condition for this is that the extreme consumer purchases from firm A, or equivalently, that the firm B franchises are isolated franchises. We now derive the consequences for equilibrium firm profits. Proposition 1. In the unique equilibrium, the two firms earn zero profits, the franchise concentration for both firms is Finally, if both firms make positive profit in a symmetric equilibrium, then each firm has an incentive to increase franchise concentration marginally above that of the other firm.
The market share lost per franchise from increasing size slightly is arbitrarily small and second order, whereas "constant returns to scale" in franchise reproduction implies a direct positive effect on profit that is first order. It follows that the two firms compete potential profits down to zero. That is, in equilibrium, firms fail to exploit the ex post heterogeneity in consumers that lead them to prefer one firm's franchise to another's. Even though the firms earn positive gross (of franchise establishment costs) profits due to this heterogeneity, in equilibrium, the cost of establishing franchises just offsets these profits.
The next section establishes the robustness of these results.
Asymmetric costs and preferences
We now relax the symmetrical properties of the economic environment to allow for 1. Firm specific heterogeneity in costs of establishing franchises, F A = F B .
2. Firm specific marginal costs of production, c i ≥ 0.
3. Consumers with preferences for one firm's product: consumers derive a common utility V + a from firm A's product and V from firm B, where a could be positive or negative.
Firm specific heterogeneity in the dimensions of a firm
Proposition 2. At least one firm earns zero profit in equilibrium.
To expand on this result consider a setting with a clearly-identifiable disadvantaged firm, say firm B. Specifically, assume F B ≥ F A , c B ≥ c A = 0, L B ≥ L A and a ≥ 0, where at least one of these inequalities is strict.
and a ≥ 0, with one inequality strict, then in the unique equilibrium
• firm B earns zero profits and firm A earns positive profits,
+ c B , and
In equilibrium the disadvantaged firm's franchises are isolated. This implies that the disadvantaged firm scales up franchise concentration to the point its profits are zero, setting the price given in Lemma 5. The advantaged firm exploits its preferred product and/or better franchise technology to earn positive profits. A numerical analysis verifies the expected comparative statics: Firm A's profit rises with a, c B , L B and F B and falls with F A and L A .
We next show in Proposition 3 that the finding that symmetric duopolists earn zero profit in the competitive equilibrium extends to a symmetric N firm setting in which each consumer receives N uncorrelated firm-specific location shocks.
Proposition 3. In the symmetric equilibrium with N firms, firms earn zero profits.
Again, the intrafirm franchise competition for the smallest firm is zero. This implies that the smallest firm can scale up its franchises, as it earns the same profit per franchise. But then, the smallest firm must make zero profits in equilibrium. In the symmetric setting an increase in N leads to smaller market shares for each franchise. As a result, firms reduce franchise concentration until the market share for each franchise returns to its "original" level. Because firms make no profit in equilibrium and market share per franchise does not change, the optimal price remains unchanged. We conjecture that this equilibrium is unique,
i.e., that there are no asymmetric equilibria.
Social Planner's Problem
In this section we return to a two firm setting 2 and compare the competitive equilibrium outcome with the solution to a social planner's problem, in which the social planner maximizes total (consumer plus producer) surplus by choosing franchise concentration for each firm; and then given this concentration choice, firms compete for customers by setting price.
To make the comparison to the symmetric competitive equilibrium meaningful, we require that the social planner establish the same franchise concentration for each firm. Because V is large enough that all consumers purchase in equilibrium, prices just transfer surplus from consumers to firms, and hence do not affect total social surplus. Hence, the social planner seeks to minimize the sum of travel and franchise establishment costs,
Proposition 4. The competitive concentration of franchises exceeds the socially optimal concentration.
It follows from Proposition 4 that at the social optimum, firms earn strictly positive profits. Intuitively, the competitive over-provision of franchises results from the efforts of firms to compete for greater market share. The social planner internalizes this externality-the social planner does not care about the market share of individual firms, but the firms do.
Contestable and Non-contestable Heterogeneity
The qualitative result that two symmetric firms earn zero profits when consumer heterogeneity is purely contestable, i.e., when the sole source of heterogeneity in consumer preferences is the endogenous spatial distance between a consumer's location and a firm's product locations, holds under many other alternative assumptions (e.g., quadratic travel costs).
We now show that what is critical for this zero profit result is that ex-post consumer heterogeneity exists only along this contestable dimension, and that there is no consumer heterogeneity along exogenous, non-contestable dimensions. To do this, we introduce a noncontestable taste variable z for each consumer, so that ex ante, consumers are distinguished by their intrinsic valuation of each firm. Specifically, we suppose that in the population 
Ex ante, the probability that a consumer shops at a firm A franchise is P rob(d 
, and
Why is it that firms earn positive profits when there is a non-contestable taste parameter? As with purely contestable heterogeneity, the conditional probability that a consumer with an extreme distant shock for firm j and no preference for one firm over the other, i.e., d c j = L/(2n) and z = 0, purchases from firm j is zero. However, now it is only in expectation that a consumer with an extreme location shock has no taste preference for one firm over the other. If a firm reduces its franchise concentration then not all consumers who were previously patronizing this franchise switch firms. The intrafranchise competition for each franchise is now positive and as franchise concentration increases, so does intrafranchise competition. As a result, as the smaller firm raises its franchise concentration, it now competes away profits from its other franchises, reducing its incentive to increase franchise concentration. As a result, firms earn positive profits in equilibrium.
The comparative statics are straightforward. As m increases, firms exploit the increased non-contestable heterogeneity to increase profit. Profits are a decreasing function of F LT :
as L or T increases, firm market power on the contestable dimension increases, causing firms to compete more aggressively for customers using franchise concentration, which reduces firm profit, and higher franchise costs F raise those costs of competing along the contestable dimension, which again reduces profit.
Comparing Proposition 1 with Proposition 5 reveals that the equilibrium number of fran-
, does not depend on whether there is a non-contestable taste dimension to consumer preferences. As before, the competitive equilibrium still features over-provision of franchises-one can show that a social planner would choose a lesser franchise concentration than what emerges in the competitive equilibrium. Again, this reflects that the social planner internalizes the competition for market share via franchise concentration.
It is not surprising that firms earn positive profits when there is a non-contestable taste dimension. The more revealing question is: relative to an economy where firms only differ on a non-contestable (taste) dimension, how does introducing a contestable (spatial) dimension affect firm profits? Recall that in our benchmark purely contestable, homogeneous firm setting, firms competed away all profits through franchise concentration. As a result, one might conjecture that adding this contestable dimension might not alter firm profits, especially since equilibrium franchise concentration is unaffected by the magnitude of the non-contestable heterogeneity. We show that this is not so -contestable heterogeneity enhances competition between firms. In particular, Proposition 6 below shows that not only do firms compete away all profits from the contestable spatial dimension, but they also compete away some of the rents from the exogenous heterogeneity in tastes.
Proposition 6. Firms earn larger profits when the only source of consumer heterogeneity is a non-contestable taste dimension than when there is also consumer heterogeneity along a contestable spatial dimension.
To understand Proposition 6, consider the impact of introducing a small noncontestable taste dimension m < √ 2F LT to the spatial model. For m < √ 2F LT , a marginal increase in non-contestable heterogeneity has a differential impact on profits in the two environments of:
where π * N C is equilibrium firm profit when there is only non-contestable consumer heterogeneity and π * C,N C is equilibrium firm profit when there is also a contestable spatial dimension. In the neighborhood of m = 0, contestable spatial heterogeneity causes firms to compete away fully three-quarters of an increase in taste heterogeneity, m. As m increases further, the price elasticity of demand for each firm falls, so that the firms compete away a smaller fraction of the profit associated with a higher m. Still, the marginal profit loss remains positive, and at m = √ 2F LT , the total accumulated profit loss equals the total franchise establishment cost. Past m = √ 2F LT , the impact of an increase in m on profit is the same in the two environments.
Conclusion
This paper endogenizes both firm pricing and franchise location within a novel spatial model in which consumers receive firm-specific location shocks. This renders the analysis with endogenous franchising feasible. In the unique equilibrium, we establish a remarkable result:
when the product is homogeneous, firms earn zero profits in equilibrium-firms over-provide franchises to such an extent that they compete away all profits. That is, even though firms face ex-post consumer heterogeneity they fail to exploit it: while ex-post consumer heterogeneity ensures positive gross firm profits, competition for market share via franchise location drives net firm profits down to zero. Indeed, this provision of franchises is socially excessivea social planner would choose a lesser franchise concentration. Hence, in the competitive equilibrium, firm profits are lower and consumer surplus is higher than they would be were franchise concentration chosen by a social planner.
The qualitative properties of these results extend when there is additional heterogeneity across firms. When firms differ in franchise costs or a firm has a better product, one firm continues to make zero net profits. Only when we introduce non-contestable consumer heterogeneity do firms cease to compete away all profits via over provision of franchises. Even here, firms so over-compete on the contestable spatial dimension, that they reduce profits below the level that they would obtain were that spatial heterogeneity absent.
Appendix: Proofs
Calculating
for i ∈ N j , j ∈ {A, B}. a j i (S j ) and a j i (S j ) are the shortest and longest distances from franchise j i 's i location to the edge of their service area.
Given strategies (S A , S B ) and location shock d j within franchise j i 's service area, the conditional expected demand y j i (d j , S A , S B ) is the measure of firm −j's circle for which the total delivery cost of the product is lower if purchased from franchise j i than from the lowest competing alternative. For a given d −j this lowest competing alternative is identified by the partition of firm −j's circle into franchise service areas. For some −j k franchises, total delivery cost by −j k to any point in its service area is lower than total delivery cost by franchise
For some −j k franchises, total delivery cost by −j k to any point in its service area is higher than total delivery cost by franchise j i to d j . The remaining −j k franchises 'split' their service area. For distances close to l −j k total delivery cost by −j k is lower than by franchise j i to d j , while for distances far away total delivery cost by −j k is higher than by franchise j i to d j . To reflect this, we partition N −j into four sets given d j , S A and S B :
We use this notation to calculate y j i (d A , S A , S B ):
Calculating Y j i (S A , S B ): By definition, we have
To prove some of our results we use a more explicit decomposition of Y j i (S A , S B ) that uses the fact that Y j i (S A , S B ) is the sum of rectangles, trapeziums and triangles. Define
c j i k is the distance from l j i at which a consumer who receives the location shock pair,
is indifferent to purchasing from franchise j i or franchise −j k .
c j i k+n −j is the distance from l j i at which a consumer who receives the location shock pair,
) is indifferent to purchasing from franchise j i or franchise −j k . We reorder c j i k so that c j i k < c j i k+1 . Let k j i = |{k : c j i k < a j i,i+1 − l j i }| and
Proof of Lemma 1: Consider two firm j franchises, i and k, i < k, where
Then fixing prices and shifting {l jm } k−1 m=i+1 marginally by the same amount counterclockwise, no franchise experiences a fall in market share (at least to a first order effect), but the market shares (sales) of franchises j k−1 and j k both strictly increase. Hence, firm j's profits must increase.
ing prices and shifting {l jm } k−1 m=i+1 marginally by the same amount clockwise, no franchise experiences a fall in market share, but the market shares of franchises j i and j i+1 strictly increase. Hence, firm j's profits must increase.
Proof of Lemma 2:
Because each firm j franchise is a isolated, each firm j franchise faces the same demand curve. It follows that charging the same price at each franchise, and hence capturing the same market share is a best response. To prove uniqueness, we show that Π j (S A , S B ) is strictly quasi-concave in p j i ∀i ∈ N j , implying that this best response is unique.
Note that y j i (d j , S A , S B ) is a continuous, piecewise linear function of p j i and l j i ; since
The marginal profit function of firm j is differentiable with respect to p j i and l j i everywhere except at prices and locations where the partition of firm −j franchises defined by L(.), M (.), H(.) and V (.) changes. At these points the number of firm −j franchises against which franchise j i competes changes discontinuously.
Because franchise j i is isolated,
y j i (l j i , S A , S B ) = 1 and marginal profit decreases linearly -the coefficient on p j i is −4/(LT ).
Hence, marginal profit is strictly decreasing over this range. If
y j i (l j i , S A , S B ) < 1 and the marginal profit function is a series of piecewise quadratic convex functions of p j i over this range -the leading term coefficient is (
Within each section, the number of competing −j franchises remains constant. Each section of the piecewise quadratic function has two real solutions over the domain of R + (else profit can increase without bound). The larger root of the quadratic in each section is where the implied franchise j i market share is 0. Hence, the marginal profit function has only one root associated with a maximum.
Proof of Lemma 3:
Fix an arbitrary franchise profile, S −j for the other firm, and consider a franchise profile for firm j with n j franchises. By fixing the prices and locations of the other firm j franchises we can analyze the impact of a marginal shift in l j i and p j i . A marginal clockwise shift in the location of franchise j i leads to a marginal change in revenue of
A marginal increase in p j i results in a marginal change in revenue of
For S j to be a best response to S −j (fixing n j ), equations (5) and (6) evaluated at (S j , S −j ) must be zero. Since by assumption no firm j franchise is isolated, this gives 2n j −1 equations in 2n j − 1 unknowns. 3 Inspection reveals that uniform franchise pricing and equal distances between franchises solves this system of equations. An exhaustive numerical analysis shows that this symmetric solution is the globally optimal best response.
3 l j1 is normalized to 0.
Proof of Lemma 4:
First note that the marginal change in demand for firm B due to a change in p B is the same as the marginal change in demand for firm A due to a change in
The first-order conditions for profit maximization of each firm with respect to its own price gives
Combining (7) and (8) gives
It remains to show that in equilibrium firm B franchises are isolated. In contradiction to the hypothesis, suppose that firm B franchises are not isolated,
Proof of Proposition 1: The first-order condition for firm A profit maximization with
Hence,
The first-order condition for firm B profit maximization with respect to p B is
where we have substituted for Y B using (4). Substituting for p * A using (9) yields
The first-order condition for firm A profit maximization with respect to p A is
where we have substituted for Y A using (3). Substituting for p A and p B using (9) and (10) into (11) then yields
The first-order condition for firm B profit maximization with respect to n B is
Hence, (9), (10), (12) and (13) imply that in equilibrium
Solving yields
Hence, in the unique equilibrium π *
The equilibrium is unique because firm profit is continuously differentiable everywhere in price and franchise concentration and the above analysis shows only one possible solution to the first-order conditions.
Proof of Proposition
This implies that in equilibrium at least one firm's representative franchise is an isolated franchise (if we have equality then all franchises are isolated). As in the previous proof, the scalability of franchise concentration then immediately implies that this firm's profits must be zero.
Proof of Lemma 5: As in the symmetric firm setting, letting p d = p A − p B , it follows that
Profit maximization implies
4 The assumption that all consumers purchase the good implies that V ≥ 9F LT 2 .
Combining (14) and (15) gives
Assume that p *
B − a)/T > 0 (we show later that these assumptions hold in equilibrium). Firm profits are
The four first-order conditions are
The first-order condition for firm B profit maximization with respect to its franchise concentration immediately implies that firm B earns zero profits. Solving (19) for
and substituting into (18), we solve for
From (17) we get
Substituting Y *
Substituting for p * A using (21) and p * B using (20), we solve for
Substituting (20), (21) and (22) into (16), reveals that n A is given by the solution to a cubic equation,
where α = a + c and β = √ 2F B L B T . Because the discriminant of G(n A ) is positive, G(n A ) has 3 real roots. Also, since the leading term coefficient is negative and
A T 2 < 0, G has at least one negative root. To be consistent with our initial premise that + β) ). G(n A ) evaluated at this lower bound is positive, implying that such a solution exists and n * A is the largest root of G(n A ).
Evaluating G at these points yields
Hence, n A < n * A < n A . We now show that p *
Using (20), (21) and (22) this is equivalent to showing 8F A n * 2
which holds since n A < n * A < n A .
Uniqueness is assured by showing that
B − a)/T > 0 must hold in equilibrium. To see this consider the three other possible outcomes.
Demand for firm B is given by
Hence, from lemma 4, p * A > p * B − c B . The four first order conditions are
Combining (23), (24) and
The first-order condition for firm B profit maximization with respect to its price implies
Substituting (28) 
Substituting for Y * B using (29) into (26) we solve for
Using the definition of X * and (28) gives
. Finally, substituting (27), (28) and (30) into (25) implies
This equality can never be satisfied since p * 
Profit maximization by firm B requires
Substituting the inequality in (31) into (32) shows
If firm A deviates and sets p A = p * B + a and n A = n * B , then Y A = 1/2 and
Proof of Proposition 3: Let firms 1 . . . N − 1 employ symmetric strategies, p 1 = . . . = p N −1 = p and n 1 = . . . = n N −1 = n One can again show that for firm N to charge a lower markup price than the other firms in equilibrium, N must serve a smaller share of the
The first-order condition for firm N with respect to n N is
The first-order condition for firm N with respect to p N is .
Proof of Proposition 4:
In the second stage each firm maximizes π i given franchise concentrations, n A = n B = n and the prices of the other firm. With n A = n B , it is straightforward to establish that the firms choose p A = p B . But then prices drop out of the social planner's objective,
Differentiating ( Denoting the optimal level of franchise concentration per firm as n * SP , we solve for
Proof of Proposition 5: Case 1: small m. We first consider the possibility that m is small enough that in equilibrium no consumer who realize location shocks {d
, 0}, j ∈ {A, B} still purchase from firm j, i.e. m < |p *
is, m is small enough that, in equilibrium, any consumer who is located at the same point as one firm's franchise and at the edge of the other firm's franchise service area will patronize the former franchise regardless of their taste preference. Under this assumption the market 5 Second-order conditions are clearly satisfied.
shares of firms A and B are
Simplifying yields 
The second-order conditions when m is small are Hence, we have a maximum since the matrix is negative definite. , 0}, j ∈ {A, B} still purchase from firm j. In this case the market shares and profits of the two firms are given by Differentiating firm profit and applying symmetry yields the equilibrium outcomes: 
The second-order conditions are
Hence, we have a maximum since the matrix is negative definite. Differentiating with respect to p i and imposing symmetry yields p * N T = m and profit π N T = m/2. This profit exceed profits when there is both contestable and non-contestable consumer heterogeneity, given by (37) when m ≤ √ 2F LT , and by (36) when m > √ 2F LT .
